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RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issues
1. Does Hall’s claim that the district court abused its discretion by not fully considering
and/or discounting Hall’s mental health issues fail because the premise of that claim –
that Hall actually has significant mental health issues – is based, at least in part, on a
misreading of the record and because the court’s finding that Hall has no Axis I mental
health diagnosis is otherwise supported by substantial evidence?
2. Has Hall otherwise failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking his probation and executing his underlying, unified sentence of eight years, with
four years fixed, imposed following his guilty plea to aggravated battery?
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Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
In February 2011, Hall stabbed Donald Cordell in the abdomen with a knife, lacerating
Mr. Cordell’s liver. (PSI, pp.2, 15, 19-20. 1) Hall fled the scene of the stabbing on foot and later
refused to cooperate with law enforcement’s efforts to investigate the circumstances of the
stabbing. (PSI, pp.2, 20.)
The state charged Hall with aggravated battery and gave notice of its intent to bring a
deadly weapon enhancement. (R., pp.32-34.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hall pled guilty to
aggravated battery and the state dismissed the enhancement and a separate case in which Hall
had been charged with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.49-60, 62-66; see also PSI,
pp.7-8, 23-26.) Before sentencing, Hall participated in a presentence investigation and also
submitted to standard mental health and substance abuse evaluations. (See generally PSI, pp.118, 33-41, 51-60; see also PSI, pp.45-50 (3/10/08 Psychological Evaluation appended to PSI).)
Although Hall told the presentence investigator he believed he “would benefit from a mental
health evaluation and counseling to address his ADD/ADHD, PTSD, and anxiety” (PSI, p.12),
the mental health evaluator determined Hall did not appear to have any functional limitations due
to mental illness and did not recommend any mental health treatment (PSI, pp.36-40). Instead,
the mental health evaluator diagnosed Hall with Antisocial Personality Disorder, Alcohol
Dependence, and Amphetamine Dependence and recommended that substance abuse treatment
“be considered.” (PSI, pp.36-40; compare PSI, pp.48-49 (psychological evaluation prepared
three and a half years earlier providing Axis I diagnoses of ADHD, Mood Disorder NOS,

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Supreme Court No.
45723 Todd Layne Hall Confidential Exhibits.pdf”
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Anxiety Disorder NOS, and Mathematics Disorder, and Axis II diagnoses of Personality
Disorder NOS and Borderline Intellectual Functioning).)
After receiving and reviewing the presentence materials, the district court imposed a
unified sentence of eight years, with four years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.73-85.)
The court specifically recommended that Hall be placed in a “Traditional Rider” program. (R.,
pp.77, 84.) Approximately one month later, however, the court received notice that, due to his
“Criminal History,” Hall had been placed in Conflict Resolution Program at the Correctional
Alternative Placement Program (CAPP) rider facility. 2 (R., pp.91-92.)
Hall successfully completed his rider programming (see generally PSI, pp.66-88) and, on
May 29, 2012, the district court suspended the balance of his sentence and placed him on
probation for 10 years or until his financial obligations were paid, whichever occurred later (R.,
pp.95-106).
On November 4, 2013, the state filed a motion to revoke Hall’s probation, alleging Hall
had violated the conditions of probation by committing several new law violations (DUI, leaving
the scene of a crash, DWOP, and failing to provide insurance in October 2013; and petit theft in
September 2012); entering a bar and consuming alcohol in May 2013; and driving without a
license or insurance in May 2013. (R., pp.108-35.) Hall admitted the allegations (except for the
allegations that he left the scene of a crash, drove without privileges and failed to provide
insurance, which the state withdrew), and the district court revoked his probation, executed his
underlying sentence, and retained jurisdiction a second time.
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(R., pp.109, 144, 146-50.)

Hall’s appellate counsel represents in both the facts and argument sections of the Appellant’s
brief that Hall’s mental health issues affected his placement in his rider programs. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.2, 3, 8 (citing R., pp.92, 153).) As explained more fully in Section I, infra, this
assertion is patently incorrect.
3

Consistent with the court’s recommendation (see R., p.148), Hall was placed in a Therapeutic
Community (TC) Rider, as IDOC staff apparently determined there was no reason that
recommendation should not be followed (R., pp.152-53). 3
Hall originally struggled in the TC rider program and appeared to staff to be
“overmedicated.” (4/15/15 APSI, pp.3-4.) However, approximately one month after his arrival
at the rider facility, Hall voluntarily stopped taking his medications and “declined to receive any
further assistance for mental health treatment through IDOC.” (4/15/15 APSI, pp.3-5 and CNote Summary, p.3.)

Within a few weeks, Hall showed a marked improvement and began

making progress in his TC programming, ultimately earning a recommendation for probation.
(4/15/15 APSI 3-6.) Consistent with that recommendation, the district court suspended the
balance of Hall’s sentence and again placed him on probation for 10 years or until his financial
obligations were paid, whichever occurred later. (R., pp.156-63.)
On January 25, 2017, the state filed a second motion to revoke Hall’s probation, alleging
Hall had violated the conditions of his probation by committing a new law violation (possession
of methamphetamine in Kootenai County); consuming alcohol; and using methamphetamine.
(R., pp.166-81.) After Hall was arraigned on the allegations in this case, he pled guilty to
possession of methamphetamine in Kootenai County Case No. CR 2017-1105 and admitted to
having violated his probation in Kootenai County Case No. CR 2014-4617 (felony DUI), and the
Kootenai County judge sentenced Hall in both cases to yet another rider. (R., pp.182, 184-90.)
Following that period of retained jurisdiction, the Kootenai County court suspended Hall’s
sentences and placed him on probation. (10/16/17 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-15, p.8, Ls.9-11; 1/5/18 Tr.,
p.26, Ls.14-18.)
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See footnote 2, supra.
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On October 16, 2017, Hall appeared in this case and admitted to having violated his
probation as alleged. (R., p.205; 10/16/17 Tr., p.4, L.11 – p.6, L.3.) On October 24, 2017, the
court continued the disposition hearing to allow Hall to apply for Mental Health Court. (R.,
p.206.) Before the disposition hearing, Hall submitted a “Sentencing Statement” in which he
represented, inter alia, that he “slipped into Major Depression” and “relapsed drinking alcohol
and using meth after the death of [his] grandmother”; he had been diagnosed with “PTSD,”
“Bipolar,” “ADHD,” and “Major Depression”; and he had “applied to Kootenai County Mental
Health Court and [was] waiting on acceptance in the event [he was] placed on probation.” (R.,
pp.211-14.)
At the outset of the disposition hearing on January 5, 2018, the parties discussed the
status of Hall’s Mental Health Court application, noting the application had not yet been received
or processed in Kootenai County, where Hall claimed to have filed it. (1/5/18 Tr., p.4, L.8 – p.5,
L.19.) The district court elected to proceed with the disposition hearing, reasoning:
Well, it doesn’t sounds like – I’ve read the presentence materials. There is
no evidence here that he is likely to be accepted for mental health court. He
doesn’t have multiple mental health hospitalizations. There’s no definite mental
health issues I can see. We went through this before when he was in front of me,
and that was back in, what, October? He doesn’t have an entitlement to be in a
specialty court. It’s a privilege, and he’s the one that says he wanted it. He’s the
one that should have followed through on it. I don’t think he is acceptable
anyway. So unless I hear otherwise, it seems to me that it’s time for us to proceed
at this point.
(1/5/18 Tr., p.5, L.20 – p.6, L.7.) Neither Hall nor the state objected to proceeding without
verification of the status of Hall’s Mental Health Court application. (1/5/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-15.)
After reviewing the disposition materials (including the original PSI, the APSIs, and the 2011
mental health assessment that was prepared for the original sentencing), receiving testimony and
allocution from Hall, and hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court revoked Hall’s
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probation and ordered his underlying sentence executed. (R., pp.222-26; 1/5/18 Tr., p.28, L.17 –
p.36, L.10.) In so doing, the court found there was no evidence that Hall had any mental health
issues (1/5/18 Tr., p.28, L.25 – p.30, L.16, p.32, Ls.20-22), that his record showed he was a
“career criminal” who had not “learned anything” (1/5/18 Tr., p.30, L.17 – p.35, L.8), and that
“placing [him] on probation would create an undue risk that [he] would commit another crime
because that’s what [he had] done every single time [he had] been on probation” (1/5/18 Tr.,
p.35, Ls.8-12). Hall timely appealed. (R., pp.227-30, 235-39.)

ARGUMENT
I.
Hall’s Assertion That He Has Mental Health Issues Which The District Failed To Fully Consider
Is Based, At Least In Part, On A Misreading Of The Record; And The Court’s Finding That Hall
Has No Axis I Mental Health Diagnosis Is Supported By Substantial Evidence
At the disposition hearing for Hall’s second probation violation, the district court found
there was no evidence that Hall had any mental health issues and that he did “not have an Axis I
diagnosis, period.” (1/5/18 Tr., p.28, L.25 – p.29, L.19; see also p.32, Ls.20-22.) In making this
finding, the district court relied on the I.C. § 19-2524 mental health evaluation prepared for
Hall’s original sentencing hearing in 2011, noting Hall’s primary diagnosis was antisocial
personality disorder and his secondary diagnosis was alcohol dependence. (1/5/18 Tr., p.29,
Ls.2-19; compare PSI, pp.36-41.) The court also noted the findings of the evaluator that Hall did
not need any mental health treatment and did not appear to have any functional limitation in his
legal matters due to mental illness, and that his legal difficulties appeared to be related to his
substance abuse. (1/5/18 Tr., p.29, L.20 – p.30, L.1; compare PSI, pp.36-39.) Finally, the court
observed that, based on its experience, Hall’s criminal history was consistent with his antisocial

6

personality diagnosis. 4

(1/5/18 Tr., p.30, Ls.2-16.)

In light of that diagnosis, the court

concluded that Hall was not a candidate for mental health court, “period,” explaining that
“antisocial personality disorder is not a mental health diagnosis. It is the way in which you
conduction your life, and it is not treatable.” (1/5/18 Tr., p.35, L.19 – p.36, L.3.)
On appeal, Hall argues that the court’s finding that he had no mental health issues “was
clearly in error,” contending “there was ample evidence in the record, including recent evidence
and testimony, of Mr. Hall’s ADHD, PTSD, depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) Hall’s argument fails both because it is based, at least in part, on a
misreading of the record and because the court’s finding that Hall has no mental health issues
and, more specifically, no Axis I diagnosis of any mental health issues, is supported by
substantial evidence.
“When considering whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho
1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016). To reach a decision by an exercise of reason, the
court must take into consideration “‘the facts and circumstances which are
necessary to make a sound, fair, and just determination, and a knowledge of the
facts upon which the discretion may properly operate.’” State v. Hooper, 119
Idaho 606, 611, 809 P.2d 467, 472 (1991).
State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 890, 392 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2017). The appellate court will "defer

4

Hall accuses the trial court of “improperly inject[ing] its own personal opinions and biases
regarding ASP.” (Appellant’s brief, p.10.) The state notes, however, that sentencing courts are
not required to disregard their own knowledge and experiences in fashioning appropriate
sentences. See State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 320-21, 563 P.2d 42, 44-45 (1977) (“Officers of
our judicial system are not monks living in cells, but rather people living in society with the
ability to see and hear. Insofar as the criminal justice system is concerned, a trial judge sits at the
juncture of the law enforcement and the judicial systems. To say that a judge may not utilize
knowledge gained from his official position … would require him to close his eyes and ears to
the real world.”); accord State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495, 681 P.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 1984).
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to the trial court's findings of fact “unless those findings are unsupported by substantial and
competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous.” State v. Covert, 143
Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006).
Hall’s argument that the court erred in finding he had no mental health issues is based, in
part, on a misreading of the record. In the facts section of his Appellant’s brief, Hall represents
that, in assessing Hall’s placement for his first and second riders, the IDOC determined that Hall
had “‘significant mental health needs that can only be provided at our most substantial mental
health setting” and, as such, Hall would “‘receive a traditional rider opportunity in conjunction
with concurrent mental health services ….’” (Appellant’s brief, pp.2-3 (quoting R., pp.92, 153).)
Hall makes a similar representation in the argument section of his brief, contending, “When Mr.
Hall was placed on his riders, the IDOC intake forms acknowledged Mr. Hall’s mental health
needs affected his placement.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.8 (citing R., pp.92, 153).)

Hall’s

representations are patently incorrect. Although the “intake forms” he cites set forth “Mental
Health Need” as among a laundry list of reasons an offender might not be placed in the rider
programming recommended by a district court, the forms themselves also explicitly state that
only “those [reasons for departing from the court’s recommendation] that apply are checked.”
(R., pp.91-92, 152-53.) Neither of Hall’s “intake forms” contain a check mark indicating that
Hall’s rider placement was affected by any “Mental Health Need.” (See generally R., pp.91-92,
152-53.) Rather, the “intake form” completed for his first rider indicates (by way of an “x” next
to the word “Other”) that the IDOC declined to follow the district court’s recommendation for a
“Traditional Rider” based solely on Hall’s “Criminal History.” (R., pp.91-92.) And the “intake
form” completed for his second rider indicates the IDOC followed the district court’s
recommendation for a “TC Rider”; there are no check marks indicating the IDOC found any
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reason, much less a reason related to Hall’s mental health, to deviate from the court’s
recommendation. (R., pp.152-53.) Thus, to the extent Hall relies on the “intake forms” as
evidence that he had “significant mental health needs,” such reliance is clearly misplaced, and he
cannot show the district court erred by not considering such evidence—because it simply does
not exist.
Hall’s claim that the court otherwise clearly erred by finding he had no mental health
issues is also without merit. In making its finding, the court relied primarily on the 2011 mental
health evaluation that (1) indicated Hall had a primary diagnosis of Antisocial Personality
Disorder and a secondary diagnosis of Alcohol Dependence, (2) concluded Hall had no
functional limitations due to mental illness, and (3) did not recommend any mental health
treatment but did recommend that substance abuse treatment “be considered.” (See 1/5/18 Tr.,
p.28, L.25 – p.30, L.1; PSI, pp.35-41.) Although the state acknowledges there is evidence in the
record showing Hall had previously been diagnosed with, inter alia, ADHD and Anxiety and
Mood Disorders, that Hall self-reported a history of mental health issues, including PTSD and
depression, and that he had received mental health treatment for unspecified reasons while
incarcerated (see, e.g., R., pp.52, 211-14; PSI, pp.12-13, 15, 45-60; 4/15/15 APSI, pp.3-5 and CNote Summary, p.3; 9/4/17 APSI, pp.5-6), the 2011 mental health evaluation is the most recent
and complete evaluation of Hall’s mental health status by a mental health professional and
supports the court’s specific finding that Hall’s Axis I diagnosis is Antisocial Personality
Disorder, not any treatable mental health issue.
Even if the district court erred in concluding Hall suffers from no mental health issues,
the error was clearly harmless. When a discretionary ruling has been tainted by legal or factual
error, the appellate court ordinarily vacates the decision and remands the matter to the trial court
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for a new, error-free discretionary determination. State v. Medrain, 143 Idaho 329, 333, 144
P.3d 34, 38 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 276, 899 P.2d 984, 986 (Ct. App.
1995). Remand is unnecessary, however, if it is apparent from the trial court's own expressed
reasoning that the result would not change or that a different result would represent an abuse of
discretion. Id.; McDonald v. State, 124 Idaho 103, 107, 856 P.2d 893, 897 (Ct. App. 1992).
Thus, if this Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court would have
revoked Hall’s probation based solely on other information before the court, appellate relief will
not be granted.
A review of the district court’s reasoning in this case shows, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the court would have revoked Hall’s probation based solely on his criminal history, failures
to comply with the terms of probation—including by committing new felonies—rule violations
during his rider programming, and risk that he would commit a new crime if released to the
community. (1/5/18 Tr., p.28, L.17 – p.36, L.10.) The state will not reproduce the court’s
reasoning here but relies on that reasoning as fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the
disposition hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)
Because the court’s expressed reasoning shows it would have revoked Hall’s probation
regardless of any of its allegedly incorrect factual findings, and because for the reasons set forth
in Section II, infra, the court otherwise did not abuse its discretion, the court’s order revoking
Hall’s probation and executing his underlying sentence should be affirmed.

II.
Hall Has Otherwise Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Revoked His Probation And Executed His Underlying Sentence
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-2601(4). The
decision whether to revoke a defendant’s probation for a violation is within the discretion of the
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district court. State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710, 390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017) (quoting State v.
Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003)). In determining whether to
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho
793, 797, 302 P.3d 1066, 1070 (Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted). A decision to revoke
probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its
discretion. Id. at 798, 302 P.3d at 1071 (citing State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d
326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992)).
Hall is not an appropriate candidate for community supervision in light of his ongoing
criminal offending, substance abuse, and disregard for the terms of probation. On appeal, Hall
contends that the district court abused its discretion by labeling Hall a “career criminal” who has
not “learned anything at all” (Appellant’s brief, p.5 (citing Tr., p.35, Ls.4-8)); however, Hall’s
extensive criminal history and failure to abide by community supervision support the district
court’s characterization. Hall’s criminal history began in 1991 at the age of 16, and includes
seven juvenile adjudications, 22 citations, 33 misdemeanor convictions, and five felony
convictions. (PSI, pp.3-7; R., pp.73-85, 186-90.) Hall also has numerous probation violations,
has been in the retained jurisdiction program four times, and has previously been incarcerated.
(PSI, pp.3-8; 1/5/18 Tr., p.32, Ls.17-19.) While incarcerated, Hall incurred six DOR’s for
bartering, possession of contraband, disobedience to orders, theft, and two for individual
disruptive behavior. (PSI, p.8.) In this case, Hall violated his probation the first time by
committing a felony DUI and a petit theft, consuming alcohol, and driving without a license or
insurance. (R., pp.108-35, 144.) He violated his probation the second time, and after receiving
the benefit of a second period of retained jurisdiction, by possessing methamphetamine,
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consuming alcohol, and using methamphetamine. (R., pp.166-81, 205.) The district court’s
assessment of Hall, his criminal history, and his failure to rehabilitate is accurate.
That Hall wishes the court would have given more mitigating weight to his performance
during his most recent period of retained jurisdiction, or even the periods of retained jurisdiction
before it, do not show an abuse of discretion. Although Hall was recommended for probation
and performed reasonably well during his most recent rider served in relation to a Kootenai
County case that formed one of the bases for his probation violations in this case (see 9/4/17
APSI), these facts alone did not mandate that the court in this case continue him on probation.
The district court in this case was not bound by IDOC’s recommendation. See State v. Hurst,
151 Idaho 430, 438, 258 P.3d 950, 958 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,
648, 962 P.2d 1026, 1032 (1998); State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615, 798 P.2d 458, 460 (Ct.
App. 1990) (“While a recommendation from corrections officials who supervised the defendant
[during the period of retained jurisdiction] may influence a court's decision, it is purely advisory
and is in no way binding upon the court.”). Nor did the district court act unreasonably in
discounting IDOC’s recommendation; Hall has a history of performing well in a structured rider
setting and then violating the conditions of his probation by consuming alcohol, using illegal
substances, and committing new crimes upon being released to supervision in the community.
(Compare PSI, pp.66-88 and 4/15/15 APSI with R., pp.108-35, 144, 166-81, 205.)
At the disposition hearing, the district court articulated its reasons for revoking Hall’s
probation and addressed Hall’s on-going criminal conduct, refusal to abide by the terms of
community supervision, failure to rehabilitate, and the risk he presents to society. (1/5/18 Tr.,
p.28, L.17 – p.36, L.10.) For the reasons set forth in Section I, supra, the state submits the court
did not make any clearly erroneous factual findings regarding Hall’s mental health but, even if it
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did, reversal is not required because the court’s expressed reasoning otherwise shows it acted
well within its discretion in revoking Hall’s probation and would have done so even had it not
made any allegedly erroneous factual findings. (See Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order revoking
Hall’s probation and executing his underlying sentence.
DATED this 28th day of December, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of November, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
LARA E. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.
__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

humbled.

I'm

a

man on hi5 knees.

a

man taking

accountability for his past.
While

was on that rider,

I

different things.

I

I

opened myself to

opened myself to aCCOuntability for

my past, changing, and learning about thinking that I've
had for years,

and also using that new thinking on

minute—by—minute timeline.
I

a

Also mentored other riders.

was in the mentor program thing that mentored other

riders while they were there to help break their chain
lO

of incarceration.

ll

So,

Your Honor, again,

I

ask you to

--

I'm on

12

my knees begging you to keep the recommendation 0f

13

probation of those responsible for this change in me and

14

allow me to show you this change through continued

15

probation.

16

Thank you.

17

THE COURT:

Thank you.

On the plea

18

admissions of violation,

19

your probation.

20

knowing and voluntary.

21

bit of time t0 demonstrate clearly that

22

all the Toohill factors that are required,

23

primary concern, quite frankly, Mr. Hall,

24

of the community.

25

I

I

fr

the

do find that you did violate

also find that the violations are

And I'm going to spend
I

a

little

have applied
and my
is protection

I'm going to first address these alleged mental
23
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issues,

and the reason

want to do that is we're going

I

to clear the air once and for all.

We have absolutely

zero evidence that you have any mental health issues.
In fact,

in 2011 there was a 19-2524 evaluation done.

and let me read to you what it says.

antisocial personality disorder.

Primary diagnosis,

He said that he was in

fourth Or fifth grade the first time he was in trouble
for stealing.

battery.

He also reported charges 0f aggravated

check fraud. false impersonation as

a

minor.

10

The findings in this report,

ll

Classes related to check fraud and false impersonation,

12

and the repository shows a disregard for safety

13

including DUI charges and traffic safety issues.

he has participated in

His secondary diagnosis is alcohol dependence.

14

15

The reason

16

mental health stuff.

17

to mental health court,

18

disorder diagnasis alone.

19

diagnosis,

20

way.

21

mental health treatment at all.

22

it says this,

23

limitation in his legal matters due to

24

It seems that his

25

substance abuse, and if you look at what they talk

I

bring that up is we keep hearing about this

it

ever,

with a personality

You do not have an Axis

I

SO we've got to get that out of the

period.

In fact,

You would nEVEr have been accepted

also says this,

he does not need any

And it's interesting,

he does not appear to have
a

a

functional

mental illness.

legal difficulties are related to

29
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CS'R

999

about,

and

all of the controlled substance issues,

share the prosecutor's observation,

I

I'm actually fairly

well known over in Ada County for pointing out that when
I

see somebody with multiple driving without privileges,

they are likely to have antisocial

it tells me

And that's not

personality disorder, which you do.
treatable,

for the record.

An antisocial personality

That's

person does not believe the rules apply to them.
why they don't bother getting driver's licenses.

driver's license is the easiest thing for

lO

Getting

ll

person to get in our society.

12

someone,

13

does seem to have grave difficulty in getting

l4

then that's what

15

lot of DWPs.

16

time coming.

a

So when you see

Period.

just as the prosecutor has pointed out,

I

--

a

a

who
license,

that's what happens is they get

want to point out this has been

a

a

long

Let's go back over your criminal record because

17

think it's important to review.

'91,

as a juvenile,

15

I

19

possession and consumption of alcohol.

2D

juvenile.

21

Prosecutor dismissed Count

22

account check, one count of false impersonation.

23

aggravated battery and attempted robbery.

24

possession of

25

deliver.

Count

a

1,

grand theft; Count
2.

'91,

'91,
2,

as a

grand theft.

two counts of no
'92,

'94,

controlled substance with intent to

Multiple probation violations, and that‘s when
30

TRACY E. BARKSDALE, RPR, CSR 999

APPENDIX A – Page 3

you had your very first retained jurisdiction.

'94,

possession of a controlled substance. petit theft,
possession of burglary tools, concealed weapon,
resisting,

and some trafficking cases.

Those were

diamiSSed as part of the plea agreement.
theft.

'96,

failure to purchase

'97,

possession of

'99,

failure to purchase

a

a

petit

'95,

driver's license.

controlled substance by an inmate.
a

driver's license, failure to

driving under the influence.

appear‘

2000,

10

battery,

resisting and obstructing.

11

2003,

12

receiving and possession of Stolen property and

l3

possession of paraphernalia.

l4

obstructing.

driving without privileges.

15

Are you seeing

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

a

2023,

2000,

2002 paraphernalia.
2003,

theft by

resisting and

pattern here,

sir?

(Nods head.)

That's why, when you said

77

when

18

your attorney asked if you were free of crime from '99

19

to 2011,

20

finished.

21

driving under the influence, driving without privileges.

22

2004,

23

driver's license.

24

accident.

25

petit theft.

That's not true.

you said yes.

I

haven't

Malicious injury to preparty, 2004.

2004

possession of paraphernalia, possession of revoked

2004,

2004,

leaving the scene of the

driving without privileges.

2005,

That was amended down from felony
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burglary.

driving without privileges.

2005,

2006,

driving without privileges, no proof 0f insurance.
2007,
is now

driving without privileges.

2007.

I

believe this

your third DUI, driving without privileges and

resisting and obstructing.
privileges.
battery.

2008,

2008,

2007,

disturbing the peace amended from

driving without privileges.

2009,

driving without privileges.

driving without privileges.

11

2010,

driving without privileges.

12

2011,

possession of

13

which was dismissed as part of

l4

driving without privileges.

15

where we are in this case,

16

case.

Now,

a

Contempt of court.

controlled substance,

felony,

plea agreement.

a

2011,

Which then brings us to
that brought you to this

subsequent to this case, you continued to

understand that someone decided

18

rack up felonies.

19

to give you a third rider.

20

decision.

21

mental health issues.

22

evidence 0f that.

23

bound by what another district judge does.

24

district judge saw it is up to him.

25

statute makes it clear,

I

2009,

And no proof of insurance.

10

17

2008,

2009, driving without

driving without privileges.
privileges.

driving without

So

I

That's that judge's

want to make also, number one.
At all.

there are no

You don‘t have any

Number two, no district judge is

Number three, the

the case law makes it clear that

u
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the judge is not bound by a recommendation from IDOC.
is nothing more than a recommendation.

It

the fact that this was your,

at least,

should have known the rules by now.

Number four,

third rider, you

And when you

testify under oath that you had no idea that you had t0
have the permission of the people at the rider to have

contact with a certain individual, tells me, again, you
That's why

don't think the rules apply.

You knew it.

you got written up.

And if someone at IDOC

Period.

10

told you that the judge doesn't bother to read written

11

warnings,

12

Maybe some judges do not read them.

13

them who do.

they don't know what they're talking about.

Now,

l4

I

know a lot of

IDOC has been very clever in recent years.

they don’t recommend relinquishment often.

15

Number one,

16

In fact,

17

a

13

How do

19

to that,

20

front of Judge Wetherell about it.

21

that to be true.

at one Point,

they had to have permission from

supervisor before they could recommend relinquishment.
I

Because they told us that.

know?
and,

actually,

In addition,

22

In addition

they testified under oath in

they

-—

SO that's why

don't recommend relinquishment very often,

24

do,

25

they didn't recommend relinquishment is fine.

that's why it is so significant.

BARKSDALE, RPR, CSR 999

APPENDIX A – Page 6

and when they

So the fact that

33
E.

know

the fact is that they

23

TRACY

I

I've

taken into account.
point,

But when

at this

after the supervision that you have been on since

2011 with regard to this case,
cases,

look at this,

I

let alone all the other

and you've committed, now you've committed

additional felonies,

can assure you that most judges,

I

you're committing new felonies while on probation,

if

and you‘ve already had two riders,

the fact is

a

very

large percentage of district judges w0u1d impose.

is

It

not unusual t0 have that happen.

You have a lot of credit for time served.

10

The

even with all of this programming

ll

thing that

12

that's gone on and all of the help that you've been

13

given,

14

to use methamphetamine.

15

do.

16

There's n0 evidence that you ever stopped drinking.

17

I

18

page

19

prison on the 1993 Ada County case, which was a

20

possession of

21

had numerous, numerous,

22

bartering, possession of contraband,

23

orders,

24

they're all, NCIC apparently also indicates that the

25

presentence history may not encompass all of your crimes

I

note is,

you have continued to drink, you have cantinued
That's what you've continued to

You have been drinking all the way through.

And

also note that, while you were in prison, you look at
8

of the presentence report,

a

when you were in

controlled substance by an inmate. you
I

will point out, DORS for

disobedience to

disruptive behavior, things of that nature.

M
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And

because NCIC indicates that you were arrested April of
1996 in Nevada for burglary and battery,

domestic

Doesn't show what the disposition is.

violence.

So the reason I'm reading all this is that you

You have been a career criminal

are a career criminal.

since you were

a

You are now a grown person.

juvenile.

You are still a career criminal.

Your LSI is extremely

that you have learned anything.
at this point,

high, and,

I

There is no evidence

believe placing you on

10

probation would create an undue risk that you would

11

commit another crime because that's what you've done

12

every single time you've been on probation.

l3

had another crime, and when you testify that you've been

l4

crime free

16

said no felonies is what

I

I

said.

THE COURT:

17
18

——

THE DEFENDANT:

15

You have

I

sir,

asked you about it‘
In my opinion.

19

I

interrupted you about that.

You said you were crime free.

imprisonment is the appropriate

2O

thing for the Court to d0, and

21

to allow you to make your application to mental health

22

court,

23

basis for you to be in mental health court, but

24

you do that.

25

antisocial personality disorder is not a mental health

even though at the time

Now,

I

I

what happened,

continued this matter

told you there was no

I

don't know.

35
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I

let

But

diagnosis.
life,

It

is

the way in which you conduct your

and it is not treatable.

in mental health court,

period.

based 0n all that,

So,

exercise of discretion,

and they do not take them

I

believe that,

in an

I'm revoking the probation that

was earlier granted and reimpose the original sentence

and sentence you to the custody of the Idaho state board
of

correction.

State of Idaho,
10

four fixed,

under the unified sentence law of the
for an aggregate of eight years with

followed by four indeterminate.

I‘m remanding you to the custody of the sheriff

ll
12

of this county to be delivered to the proper agent state

13

board of correction for execution of sentence.

l4

is exonerated,

15

served prior to entry of this judgment.

l6

I

Any bail

and credit will be given for all the days

think it's important that you review that,

17

Counsel, make sure that it's accurate.

18

always ask to make that accurate.

If not,

you can

It is further ordered that you shall provide a

19
20

DNA sample to the department of corrections pursuant to

21

19—5501.

22

defender reimbursement.

23

suspended shall be imposed.

24

in the amount that was originally ordered.

25

I

am not imposing new court costs 0r public

Now,

Any fines that were previously

And restitution will remain

you have the right to appeal, and if you
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